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TAKINGS AND THE POST-MODERN
DIALECTIC OF PROPERTY
Gregory S. Alexander*
In recent years a debate has been going on both in the narrow
confines of legal scholarship and in the press concerning constitutional protection of private property. Newspapers regularly include
articles, columns, and editorials about government agencies that
have extended their regulatory power over some resource--whether
wetlands, landmark buildings, or rental apartments-and many
property owners are outraged at what they view as a gross intrusion
on their private domain. The intrusion seems all the worse to these
property owners and their supporters because the government's action with respect to their things is more than an inconvenient bureaucratic requirement like mandatory recycling. It is rather a
substantial usurpation of their ownership rights that is unaccompanied by any compensation. In legal argot, it is a "taking" of property that masquerades as mere "regulation."
To make matters worse, American courts, including (or perhaps one should say especially) the United States Supreme Court,
have been confused and confusing in their attempts to define the
scope of legal protection for property under the takings clauses of
the federal and state's constitutions. The Supreme Court has applied various tests for determining when a regulation "goes too far,"
as Justice Holmes put it, t and becomes a taking of property. There
seems to be little rhyme or reason to the application of these tests,
and their collective effect throughout most of this century has been
to leave government regulators pretty much unconstrained, at least
by the takings clause. More recently, however, the Court appears
to have taken a new tack, which might reinvigorate the takings
clause as a check on government intervention with the rights of private ownership of property. But the significance of these latest takings decisions has been the subject of almost as much disagreement
• Professor of Law, Cornell University. This paper is a modified version of a lecture
delivered as part of Valparaiso University School of Law's Colloquium on the Bill of Rights,
October 27, 1991.
I. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
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as was focused on the underlying question of the appropriate scope
of government regulation of property rights.
In this brief paper I want to describe a way of understanding
the current takings scene. Many people believe that there is a single
traditional understanding of what property is and why it is protected in our constitutional scheme. This view is commonly attributed to those on the political Right, but some commentators on the
Left have also accepted it, usually as a prelude to attacking the central position that property occupied in the Founders' vision, particularly that of James Madison.2 On both ends of the political
spectrum, these commentators believe that the takings clause has
always been understood according to what I will call the selfregarding vision of property. According to this vision, the crucial
fact of political and social life in our political and legal culture is
that each person is free to do or say pretty much what he wants,
within certain obvious limits. The purpose of property and its constitutional protection, then, is nothing more or less than to create a
wall between the individual and the collective that will guarantee
the individual the space, literally as well as figuratively, to satisfy
his own desires.
I will argue that this picture is radically incomplete. There is
in fact a second, competing, vision of the role of property that is
present in our political and legal discourse. I will call this alternative vision "communitarian."3 An equally apt label, one that emphasizes its historical and current connection with the civic
republican tradition, is "civic." This vision is not, however, strictly
republican, for it includes an important element that is not uniquely
republican. That element is best expressed by the term "responsibility." The self-regarding vision defines the role of property exclusively in terms of strong individual rights or individual
2. See Jennifer Nedelsky, Private Property and the Limits of American Constitutionalism: The Madisonian Framework and Its Legacy (U. of Chi. Press, 1990) ("Private Property").
Professor Nedelsky's book states an interpretation of American constitutionalism that resembles in certain respects Louis Hartz's thesis that the United States has had a single, continuous political tradition since its founding. Louis Hartz, The Liberal Tradition in America
(Harcourt, Brace, 1955). That tradition is Lockean liberalism. One of its aspects was a conception of property, usually associated with Locke's name, that C.B. Macpherson called
"possessive individualism." C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford U. Press, 1962). Like Hartz, Nedelsky sees just one dominant
understanding of politics and property in American history, at least since 1789. She associates that tradition with the name of James Madison, rather than John Locke.
3. In calling this an alternative vision, I do not mean to reduce the dialectic to the
stark contrast that is sometimes drawn between "liberalism" and "communitarianism." That
contrast is simplistic and misleading. Both visions that I describe here can be considered
liberal; they reflect what Nancy Rosenblum has aptly called the "two faces" of liberalism.
See Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction, in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., Liberalism and the
Moral Life I, 5 (Harv. U. Press, 1989).
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expectations. It has nothing to say about the individual property
owner's responsibility as a member of the community. The communitarian vision, by contrast, emphasizes the individual property
owner's sense of responsibility to his community for the use of his
property as central to the owner's fully realizing his individual
freedom.4
The effect of recognizing the communitarian vision will be to
deny that there is a single privileged understanding, conceptual or
historical,s of why or when property is or should be constitutionally
protected. Neither side in arguments about takings can trump the
other by appealing to some mythic understanding of property's role
in our political system. Rather than a single understanding, a dialectic between two competing understandings has shaped the takings clause. 6
I call this dialectic "post-modem" because the present stage of
legal discourse about property postdates the era when legal discourse exhibited a widely-shared understanding that property had a
single meaning or purpose. Legal discourse during that era, the era
of legal modernity, in fact was also dialectical, but the dialectic was
not dominantly articulated in terms of a conflict between two contradictory core purposes of property. Post-modernity, which I want
to distinguish from post-modernism, is the legal culture that we
now inhabit. In post-modem legal culture--our culture-legal discourse no longer can plausibly assume a common, unified political
theory of property rights or indeed assume that property rights do
4. For lucid discussions of takings issues from a communitarian perspective, see Mary
Ann Glendon, "Absolute" Rights: Property and Privacy, in I The Responsive Community 12
(Fall 1991) and Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse
25-30, 112-14 (Maxwell MacMillan, 1991). For an interesting discussion of water law from a
communitarian perspective, see Eric T. Freyfogle, Context and Accommodation in Modern
Property Law, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 1529 (1989).
As Professor Glendon's work indicates, the thesis that individual owners owe responsibilities to their communities merely by virtue of their relationships with those communities is
not the exclusive property of the radical Left. For a similar expression of the communitarian
theme by another distinguished centrist property scholar, see John Edward Cribbet, Concepts
in Transition: The Search for a New Definition of Property, 1986 U. Ill. L. Rev. I, 6, 40.
5. For a discussion of legal discourse's ambivalence about the role of property during
one stage of our past, the civic republican period, see Gregory S. Alexander, Time and Property in the American Republican Legal Culture, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 273 (1991).
6. In an earlier essay, I argued that conflicting views over the Supreme Court's recent
takings cases were best understood as a dialectic between two visions of government, the
public-choice theory and the republican theory. See Gregory S. Alexander, Takings. Narratives. and Power, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1752 (1988). Carol Rose and Frank Michelman have
developed similar dialectical interpretations of takings jurisprudence generally. See Carol
Rose, Mahon Reconstructed: Why the Takings Issue Is Still a Muddle, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 561
( 1984); Frank Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the Constitutional Idea of Property, 72
Iowa L. Rev. 1319 (1987).
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or should have a central role to play in politics. 1 Thus, although
aspects of both the self-regarding and communitarian visions of
property were evident in our prior doctrinal practices, the conflict
between them only recently developed into the overriding predicament occupying legal property discourse as part of a broader cultural movement away from totalizing theories and immutable
foundations.
This dialectic is post-modem in another sense as well. Unlike
classical nineteenth-century dialecticism, the post-modem dialectic
of takings discourse does not culminate in any grand synthesis.
Post-modem legal culture is characterized by particularity and perspective. There is no neutral ground available to us for reconciling
in a conclusive sense the two visions. The dialectic will simply continue. Lest this seem unduly pessimistic, however, I hasten to add
that while takings disputes will continue to be shaped by this dialectic, these disputes can be and are resolved through the exercise of
practical judgment, rather than through unvarnished political
preference.
Legal discourse about takings has neither been static nor undergone linear transformations. Rather, it has been dialectical. The
rhetoric of the dialectics has changed over time, but underlying
these different rhetorical articulations is a continuous predicament,
which I have elsewhere called the "dialectic of sociality."s This
predicament concerns the relationship between individuals and the
communities to which they belong. Conventional takings analysis
creates ample room for asking what responsibilities government
regulators owe property owners. But legal discourse, dominated by
the rhetoric of rights, rarely directly asks another important question: What is the extent of the responsibilities that individuals owe
to their communities, including political communities, as a result of
their membership? One can glean from legal discussions of takings
issues, however, two quite different responses to this question.
One answer, the self-regarding vision, begins by supposing that
the crucial fact of political and social life is that each person be free
to do or say what he wants, within certain limits. A person who
holds this view says, "I don't owe society or the community anything, except to avoid harming others." This type of person views
himself as a Lone Ranger or, better, Natty Bumppo. The Natty
Bumppo image is particularly apt because what makes this vision so
7. For statements that property does not or should not have a significant political role,
see Nedelsky, Private Property (cited in note 2); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Nomos XXII: Property 69 (N.Y.U.
Press, 1980).
8. Alexander, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 277 (cited in note 5).
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compelling is how it is supported by a mythology that is still deeplyembedded in American thought: the myth of the American as westerner-alone, out on the frontier, responsible only for himself, unconstrained by society or government. This is the central image of
freedom for many Americans today, despite the fact that it is so
wildly at odds with the conditions of modern American life.
Communitarians provide quite a different answer to the question. They regard individuals as inextricably enmeshed within both
various communities and the polity as a whole. Because communitarians understand individuals as fundamentally social,9 they
believe that improving one's own lot is not the only source of
human action. Without denying either the fact that humans frequently, indeed usually behave to benefit themselves, or the legitimacy of this motive, communitarians believe that social and moral
commitments to communities constitute another source of human
action. They reject the view that individuals are primarily responsible to themselves, and only minimally responsible to the various
groups in which those individuals participate. They emphasize responsibility to the social and political networks in which individuals
are enmeshed because those networks are sources of individual
freedom along with rights, that distance individuals from the collectivity. Unlike those who hold the self-regarding vision, communitarians do not understand freedom as pre-social, but as
meaningful only within a social context. Robinson Crusoe was not
subject to social constraints but neither did he experience human
freedom. Natty Bumppo was free precisely because of his relationship with the society from which he seemed to be so distant.
If Natty Bumppo symbolizes the self-regarding vision of the
American individual, Thomas Jefferson's citizen-farmer symbolizes
the civic American. The citizen-farmer owns his plot of land not
just to increase his personal wealth or to satisfy his personal preferences, but to enable him to fulfill responsibilities that he owes to his
community, including the uses to which he puts his plot of land. to
The key civic insight, then, is this: Individuals owe responsibilities
to others, and not just to their families and friends but more widely
to their political community, merely by virtue of their membership
within that community.
It is important to emphasize that this communitarian vision is
not merely aspirational, but descriptive. That is, communitarians
claim that people do in fact act out of a conviction that they are
9.
1982).
10.

See Michael J. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge U. Press,
See Alexander, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 273 (cited in note 5).
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responsible to social groups and to the community as a whole, in
addition to acting to improve their own positions in a narrower
sense. II
These two visions-self-regarding and communitarian-lead to
two different and incompatible understandings of the role of property rights. These clashing understandings are the basis for the conversational dead-end that now largely characterizes American legal
discourse about the takings issue.
The self-regarding vision suggests that the role of property
rights is to serve as a basis for separating the individual from government and from society generally. According to this understanding, individual freedom means freedom from collective coercion.
Being autonomous means being able to opt out of group relations if
one objects to a group's actions, to "exit," in the illuminating vocabulary that the economist Albert Hirschman coined several years
ago. 12 The purpose of all rights, this view continues, is to give individuals the power to fend off groups, especially the state, and property rights are one source of this defensive power. More than that,
property rights are fundamental rights. As a source of authority,
they are superior to and take precedence over popular sovereignty.
Individuals who hold this view of fundamental rights in general,
whom Bruce Ackerman has recently described as "rights foundationalists,"I3 are not anti-democratic. Rather, they believe that the
hierarchy of authority that the Constitution creates subordinates
democracy to certain fundamental rights. Which rights hold this
privileged position is subject to debate, but those who hold the understanding of the role of property that I am describing here place
property rights among the select list.
The claim that property rights are foundational, which I will
call the "property rights foundationalist theory," has two versions,
one strong and the other somewhat weaker. The strong version
contends that individual property rights are not just a crucial source
of separation but the preeminent source of individual autonomy in
our political system. This argument recognizes that political rights,
including the rights of speech, travel, and privacy, are also important in defining the individual in our society as free and self-regarding, but it contends that political rights are not equal in stature to
property rights. Political rights can and often do conflict with propII. See, e.g., Amitai Etzioni, The Moral Dimension: Toward a New Economics (Collier
MacMillan, 1988).
12. See Albert 0. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms.
Organizations. and States (Harv. U. Press, 1970).
13. Bruce A. Ackerman, We the People: Foundations II (Belknap Press, 1991 ).
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erty rights.I4 To resolve these conflicts, individual rights must be
ranked hierarchically, and the self-regarding vision considers it essential to attach the highest priority to property rights. 15 Securing
strong individual property rights is the best way to limit
government.
This priority for property rights has been defended on a
number of bases. James Madison, for example, argued that in a
democracy property rights are more vulnerable than political
rights.I6 This asymmetry derives from the inevitably unequal distribution of property, he reasoned. The haves share with the havenots a concern for political rights. But the have-nots cannot be expected to respect property rights.
The weaker version of the property rights foundationalist theory seeks to establish a parity between property and political rights
rather than the supremacy of property rights. This version has been
one of the constant rallying cries of the Right in the past few decades. I? Conservatives have argued for parity rather than
supremacy because as they see things (with considerable cause), the
judicial attitude in the post-Lochner era has been strongly tilted in
favor of the supremacy of political over property rights. Few economic regulations are struck down under any of the constitutional
provisions that appear to protect property and contract. By contrast, regulations encroaching on speech interests are highly vulnerable to judicial review. In the famous Carotene Products footnoteis
the Court explicitly stated that property rights are an inferior form
of individual rights, less deserving of constitutional protection that
political rights. Proponents of the property-as-separation theory
seek to end this double standard (as they see it), arguing that property interests are as vital to safeguarding individual liberty as are
speech and other non-economic interests.
14. For a recent example of such a conflict, see Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins,
447 U.S. 74 (1980) (held no taking where state law prevents shopping center owners from
excluding people who are engaged in constitutionally protected speech).
15. Scholars on both the left and the right have argued that the American constitution
historically assigned greatest priority to protecting property rights. See Nedelsky, Private
Property (cited in note 2); Richard Allen Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of
Eminent Domain (Harv. U. Press, 1985) ("Takings").
16. Madison himself did not consider property rights more important than political
rights. His statement that property "embraces everything to which a man may attach a value
and have a right" was not intended to reduce all political rights to property rights. Rather,
his point was that political rights, as rights, have the same character as property rights. See
Alexander, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. at 331-32 (cited in note 5).
17. See, e.g., Richard Funston, The Double Standard of Constitutional Protection in the
Era of the Welfare State, 90 Pol. Sci. Q. 261 (1975). For a sophisticated critique of this
argument, see C. Edwin Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U. Pa. L. Rev. 741 (1986).
18. United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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It is this self-regarding understanding of property that underlies the arguments made in recent years by several commentators, to
the effect that virtually all land use regulation and other economic
regulations should be held invalid under the takings clause.I9 These
commentators view well-established land-use regulations like zoning, not to speak of more exotic forms of regulations like the sort of
exaction involved in the recent Nollan decision,2o as clear instances
of exactly what the takings clause was designed to prevent: collective interference with the private landowner's separate domain. According to this view, the metaphor that best expresses the purpose
of the takings clause is a boundary2I or wall. The takings clause
should be thought of as creating a wall between government and
individual in the use of his land. Just as the establishment clause of
the First Amendment creates a wall between the government and
the individual with respect to religious membership, protecting individuals from state-initiated religious oppression, the takings clause
makes property a wall that secures individuals from government
depredations against the material conditions of an individual's life.
The communitarian vision, in contrast, sees property as a necessary basis for belonging within society and its government. Property rights are protected to enable citizens to participate in public
life, rather than merely to satisfy their private preferences. An obvious-perhaps the most obvious-aspect of this understanding is the
relationship that classical republicanism defined between property
and participation. In its various incarnations, republicanism has
consistently identified the central role of property as being to endow
citizens with material well-being sufficient to guarantee independence so that they might pursue the common good rather than being distracted by narrowly self-interested concerns. As Frank
Michelman has pointed out, this relationship between property and
participation leads to an emphasis on distribution.22 Republicans
like John Adams were preoccupied with a concern that an unequal
distribution of property would undermine the republican polity.
Citing the seventeenth-century English theorist James Harrington's
dictum that power always follows property,23 Adams expressed the
19. See, e.g., Epstein, Takings (cited in note 15); Ellen Frankel Paul, Property Rights
and Eminent Domain (Transaction Books, 1987); Bernard H. Siegan, Editor's Introduction:
The Anomaly of Regulation under the Takings Clause, in Bernard H. Siegan, ed., Planning
Without Prices: The Takings Clause as It Relates to Land Use Regulation Without Compensation (D.C. Heath, 1977).
20. No/lan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
21. For a trenchant critique of the boundary metaphor, see Jennifer Nedelsky, Law.
Boundaries. and the Bounded Self, in 30 Representations 162 (1990).
22. See Michelman, 72 Iowa L. Rev. at 1327-29 (cited in note 6).
23. See James Harrington, The Commonwealth of Oceana, in Maurice Cowling, et a!.,
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need to maintain a balance of property in order to maintain a balance of power. He stated:
The only possible way ... of preserving the balance of power on
the side of equal liberty and public virtue is to make the acquisition of land easy to every member of society; to make a division
of the land into small quantities, so that the multitude may be
possessed of landed estates.24

The traditional republican relationship between property and participation, though, is not the only aspect of the communitarian vision. Equally if not more important, modern communitarianism
emphasizes responsibility as a notion that is largely absent from our
political vocabulary these days. The communitarian ethic stresses
the importance of responsibility to others as well as to oneself. Indeed, it considers that personal and civic responsibility are closely
connected. A sense of civic responsibility-responsibility to others
and to the polity-grows out of the experience of responsibility to
oneself. Living a life in which one feels accountable for one's decisions and actions, rather than passing the buck to someone else,
impresses on one an awareness of one's interrelationships with
others. Being held accountable for one's actions encourages deliberation about the consequences of those actions on others. A person
who has developed a robust sense of personal responsibility feels a
greater sense of moral obligation to others. He feels a deep sense of
obligation particularly to the communities with which he identifies
himself. He feels committed to those communities and realizes that
he affects their well-being.
How does this understanding of responsibility affect views
about the role of private ownership of property and the question of
constitutional protection of property rights? It means that you are
not free to use your land or other resources in any way you want
simply because you own it. Indeed, private ownership has never
been understood to entail complete freedom of use. The common
law quite early imposed substantial constraints, through the law of
nuisance, on what landowners could do with their property, and
these constraints were rooted in the common law judges' recognition that individual owners owe some responsibility to others
around them. If you live in a residential neighborhood, for example, you owe members of that community the obligation not to interfere substantially with their opportunity to enjoy their property
eds., The Political Works of James Harrington 157, 163-65 (Cambridge U. Press, 1977);
James Harrington, The Prerogative of Popular Government, in id. at 394, 404-12.
24. Letter from John Adams to James Sullivan (May 26, 1776), in Charles Francis
Adams, ed., 9 The Works of John Adams 376-77 (Little, Brown, 1854).
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by putting a factory on your land.2s
The communitarian understanding of ownership is also reflected in the long-standing doctrine that government regulations of
uses that impose substantial harms on the public do not constitute
compensable takings.26 It is implicit in the "noxious use" exception
to regulatory takings analysis, which holds that it is not unfair to
make an owner whose use substantially threatens some serious injury to the community to which he belongs bear the costs of abating
the nuisance; as a member of the community, he is responsible to
them and owes them an obligation not unduly to threaten the quality of their lives.
I do not mean to suggest that the communitarian understand25. Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915).
26. See Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272
(1928); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887).
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed this doctrine unanimously in Keystone Bituminous
Coal Industry v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
The Supreme Court's analysis in Keystone left the parameters of this exception ambiguous in a crucial respect. After affirming the public nuisance exception, the Court went on to
analyze whether the regulation in question produced an impact on the individual owner so
adverse that the regulation constituted a taking despite its anti-nuisance effect. It is unclear,
then, whether categorizing regulations as anti-public nuisance means that they cannot be
compensable takings even if they also fall within one of the tradition categories of regulatory
takings-permanent physical invasion, deprivation of economic viability, or destruction of
investment-baked expectations-or whether an anti-public nuisance regulation may still trigger the compensation requirement if it falls within one of those categories. See Michelman,
Takings, 1987, 88 Colum L. Rev. 1600, 1603-04 n.l9 (1988). Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in Keystone, adopted the latter interpretation. 480 U.S. at 513.
The Court is likely to resolve this ambiguity this Term when it reviews the decision of
the South Carolina Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 404 S.E.2d
895 (S.C. 1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3371 (Nov. 19, 1991). In Lucas, the South Carolina court held that the mandatory setback requirements of the South Carolina Beachfront
Management Act did not constitute a compensable taking despite the fact that the effect of
the regulation was completely to deprive the individual owner of two vacant beachfront lots
of all opportunity to build any permanent structure on his lots other than a small deck or
walkway. The court reasoned that the regulation fell within the public nuisance-abatement
category, since the setback requirement was designed to prevent erosion of the beach/dune
area of South Carolina's coast. It explicitly rejected the owner's argument that by denying
him "all economically viable use" of his property, the regulation effected a compensable taking, despite its nuisance-abatement status. The court erroneously assumed that the United
States Supreme Court in Keystone had concluded that even if they deprive owners of all
economic viability, regulations that fall within the public nuisance doctrine cannot constitute
compensable takings.
What is at stake in Lucas is less whether states will be forced to pay for land that they
need to protect than the continued viability of environmental program such as South Carolina's Beach Management Plan. Given the severe budgetary restrictions that states face these
days, it seems highly unlikely that South Carolina could alford to pay for the cost of acquiring beachfront property through eminent domain. At the same time, however, the individual
landowner has an obvious interest at stake. The communitarian vision recognizes that individual owners must sacrifice some measure of freedom to use their property as they wish, but
it does not require them to commit economic hara-kiri. Even under that vision, it is far from
clear how the Court should resolve the Hobson's choice that Lucas presents.
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ing of the takings clause amounts to an expansion of the traditional
public nuisance doctrine into a general theory for distinguishing between uncompensable regulations and compensable takings. Frank
Michelman pointed out nearly twenty-five years ago that classifying
land-use regulations as compensable or not on the basis of whether
they prevent harms or extract benefits encounters a "basic difficulty." He articulated that difficulty in this way: "Such a method
will not work unless we can establish a benchmark of 'neutral' conduct which enables us to say where refusal to confer benefits ...
slips over into readiness to inflict harms."27 Michelman's point is
that whether a regulatory constraint on land use prevents a harm or
extracts a benefit all depends on how you look at it. How you look
at it will be deeply influenced by which of the two visions in the
dialectic I have described you bring to the question. But although
neither the public-nuisance test nor any other single test can ever
serve as a general theory for what governmental actions constitute a
taking, the public-nuisance test reflects the central communitarian
insight that property ownership is inevitably social and that the social context within which property exists is itself the source of responsibilities, as well as rights, of ownership.
Let me briefly illustrate the effect of these two visions by applying them to a form of land-use regulation that has been very controversial in recent years, restrictions on the use and disposition of
wetlands. The existing state and federal wetlands regulations are
quite varied and complex, and I am not concerned here with their
details. My interest rather is connecting the discourse about wetlands regulation in general with fundamental images of power and
core visions of the relationship between property owners and their
communities.
More than half of the wetlands in the United States have been
lost to developmenvs Wetlands are attractive to developers because they can be purchased cheaply, and when developed for vacation homes or resorts they are worth a great deal more than the
acquisition cost. However, once developed, wetlands no longer provide crucial ecological benefits. Wetlands are natural habitats for
thousands of organisms; losing wetlands creates a substantial risk of
damage to the biodiversity that scientists believe is essential to the
region's ecological health. Wetlands serve other functions as well.
They filter pollutants, replenish water supplies, and prevent soil erosion. They play a critical role in improving water quality by trap27. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1165, 1197 (1967).
28. See Jean Seligmann, What on Earth Is a Wetland?, Newsweek 48 (Aug. 26, 1991 ).
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ping and filtering sediment, serving as a natural flood control
system. Some scientists have referred to wetlands as "nature's kidneys" because they filter nitrates (produced by nitrogen fertilizers)
and toxic materials from water before these materials contaminate
ground water, rivers, bays, and oceans. Wetlands also provide an
essential habitat for fish and serve as a spawning ground for over
60% of the nation's commercial fishing catches.
Agricultural interest groups have for years attacked various
state and federal wetlands regulations as unduly intrusive of their
property rights, and recently they succeeded in convincing the Bush
administration (in particular, Vice President Quayle's Competitiveness Council) to propose new federal regulations exempting large
areas from being classified as wetlands. The debates leading up to
this decision are revealing because they indicate that the political
issue of whether wetlands regulations are rational and the legal issue of whether wetlands regulations constitute takings are framed in
precisely the same terms. The agricultural lobby, led by the American Farm Bureau Federation, stated the political issue in populist
terms: independent farmer-landowners vs. government regulators.29
The Farm Bureau, for example, circulated a list of 417 cases of
"people's lives being devastated" by overly aggressive federal regulators.3o This discourse frames the legal and political issue in the
same terms; both in politics and in law, the takings question is one
of power imbalance-powerless individual landowners vs. coercive
government regulators.3I
Depicting wetland regulations in this way creates a strong
emotional and political case for using the takings clause in an activist fashion to the redress the power imbalance. The self-regarding vision provides the conceptual foundation for such an activist
use of the takings clause to check the excesses of powerful government regulators. But how accurate is this depiction of the power
positions of the two sides? Are wetlands regulations the consequence of an imbalance in the distribution of power between owners
and regulators, in which government regulators have simply overwhelmed individual farm owners?
One can tell quite a different story32 about the agriculture
lobby and wetlands regulation, and this alternative story under29. See George Anthan, Farm Groups Dramatize Impact of Wetlands Issue, Ithaca
Journal 7A (Oct. 15, 1991).
30. ld.
31. See Alexander, 88 Colum. L. Rev. at 1752 (cited in note 6).
32. On storytelling about property generally, see Carol M. Rose, Property as Storytelling: Perspectives from Game Theory, Narrative Theory, Feminist Theory, 2 Yale J. L. &
Hum. 37 (1990).
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mines the case for using the takings clause in the activist way that
opponents of wetlands regulations would like. The 1989 federal
regulations hardly devastated the farming plans of individual farmers. The farm lobby produced scant evidence that the existing restrictions prohibited farmers from growing crops on land already in
production. Nor was much evidence about such consequences
likely to have been available since the 1989 regulations specifically
exempted land cropped as of 1985.
If farmers' plans were devastated at all, it was not their plans
to cultivate, but their expectations of realizing substantial gains by
selling farm acreage containing wetlands to real estate developers or
leasing farm land for oil and gas exploration. Looking past the
"Farm-Aid" rhetoric that the agriculture lobby deployed against
the 1989 regulations, the real beneficiaries of the new wetlands regulations are developers and oil and gas firms. As a columnist who
writes on agricultural issues has noted, "The truth is that more wetlands, rather than less, are in agriculture's best interest since wetlands help keep nitrates from reaching ground water."JJ
A more compelling argument why wetlands regulations should
be compensable is that they single out farmers as the group for carrying a disproportionate share of the burden of protecting parts of
our environment.J4 This argument raises the equal protection aspect of takings law. Saul Levmore defines the singling-out phenomenon as occurring when "the government's aims could have been
achieved in many ways but the means chosen place losses on an
individual or on persons who are not part of an existing or easily
organized political coalition."Js Persons who are part of a political
coalition or who can easily form one have a weaker basis for objecting when regulators place restrictions on them since they can
protect their interests through politics.
The takings clause, on this view, functions to protect, through
the compensation requirement, those persons who cannot easily
protect their interests through the normal processes of interestgroup politics. This is not the appropriate occasion for discussing
potential objections to this theory, so let us accept it for present
purposes. It would be ludicrous to argue that farmers lack the
means to protect their special interests through the usual political
process.
33. See Anthan, Ithaca Journal at 4A (cited in note 29).
34. On the general problem of singling out, see Saul Levmore, Just Compensation and
Just Politics, 22 Conn. L. Rev. 285 (1990).
35. Saul Levmore, Takings, Torts, and Special Interests, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1333, 1345
(1991).
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As the revision of the 1989 federal wetlands regulations indicates, farmers constitute an extremely well-organized and powerful
lobby which is quite capable of protecting its interests through
political means. There is no reason to believe that the lobby is any
less capable of using politics at the state level. Moreover, the coalition opposing wetlands regulations consists of interest groups in addition to farmers. These interest groups, including real estate
developers and oil and gas producers, are also highly organized and
politically powerful. There is no reason, then, to think that wetlands regulations were enacted because of the monopoly of the
political market by one interest group. Nor is there any good reason to consider persons having an economic interest in wetlands as
singled out by a distorted political process for special burdens.
At the core of the agricultural lobby's legal-political narrative
is the self-regarding conception of property ownership. Opponents
of wetlands regulation depict the regulations as burdening their
property rights in order to confer an uncompensated benefit on
other special interest groups, in particular, environmentalists. The
communitarian account of wetlands regulations emphasizes the
widespread and long-term public harm that results from loss of wetlands. The relativity of harms and benefits means that regulatory
actions like wetlands regulations can just as easily be interpreted as
preventing substantial public harms as construed in the benefitextracting story that regulatory opponents tell. Which story one
tells depends on the normative theory of responsibility to the community one applies. Communitarian theory, in describing wetlands
regulations as a matter of preventing long-term and widespread
public damage, rests on a normative understanding of ownership as
entailing wider responsibilities to others than merely avoiding immediate harms of the sort that would be actionable as trespass or
common-law nuisance.
It is appropriate to ask, then, how the communitarian vision
can be reconciled with the takings clause. Does that vision lead to
the conclusion that there is no role for the takings clause to play,
that the state should be free to appropriate resources without paying compensation so long as some public-minded justification for
the appropriation can be provided? The basic communitarian
premise is that justice does not always require that the state compensate an owner for property it has taken from him. This point
was effectively made more than half a century ago by Morris
Cohen, who stated, "[W]hile this [state compensation for taking an
owner's property] is generally advisable in order not to disturb the
general feeling of security, no absolute principle of justice requires
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it."36

The distribution of property is established by the state, not by
appropriations from a state of nature. This does not morally entitle
the state to redistribute as it wishes, but it does indicate that any
moral obligation to compensate does not exist merely by asserting
some pre-political right to property. Private ownership is not only
state-created but also conditional. Individual owners are not free to
do whatever they wish with or to their property. They owe certain
responsibilities to the communities to which they belong, and these
civic responsibilities condition individual freedom of ownership.
At the same time, it is equally important to emphasize what it
implicit in the first half of Cohen's statement, that the communi tarian vision does not represent a dissolution of the line between public
and private ownership. Communitarianism should not be understood as abandoning a commitment to individual property rights.
The subordination of property rights to human rights is a mark of a
society's progress, but it is equally true that the replacement of
property rights with centralized control over the material conditions of existence is the mark of social regress.
A central purpose of property that the civic and non-civic traditions alike recognize is respecting the individual's sense of dignity.
The testimony of the recently liberated citizens of east-central Europe confirms the importance of property rights for individual dignity. Our own personal experiences confirm the need for
individuals to feel that they control the concrete, immediate conditions of their existence. A second and, from the perspective of the
civic understanding, at least equally important purpose of individual ownership is its role in developing a individual's sense of personal responsibility. The civic vision regards individual property
ownership as one of the fundamental social institutions by which
individuals develop a sense of responsibility both to themselves and
to the communities of which they are a part.
The responsibility function of property overlaps substantially
with the dignity rationale. Both a sense of responsibility and a sense
of dignity depend upon individuals having the power to make decisions over matters that affect the immediate circumstances of their
lives. From the civic point of view, state socialism is offensive precisely because, contrary to its rationale, it stunts the individual's
sense of responsibility to the community. It renders citizens passive
and powerless. Classical liberal ownership enables individuals to
develop a sense of responsibility by vesting final accountability for
36.

Morris R. Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 Cornell L. Q. 8, 24 (1927).
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their actions in themselves rather than in some faceless
bureaucracy .37
If the takings clause continues to be a vital source of constitutional protection under the civic vision, but not to implement the
self-regarding vision, what scope should it have? To begin with, the
takings clause is a collective precommitment device. It is a limitation on democratic power that is necessary because majorities have
incentives to sacrifice long-term to short-term objectives. As the
Founders realized and emphasized, the threat of destabilizing or illconsidered expropriations of property isn't confined to monarchies
but exists in democracies as well. Jon Elster explains the point:
If all issues were subject to simple majority voting, society would

lack stability and predictability. A small majority might easily
be reversed, by accidents of participation or by a few individuals

changing their minds. More important, if the majority followed
short-lived passions or short-term expediency, it might act rashly
and override individual rights granted by earlier decisions.Js

The takings clause adds a degree of stability that would otherwise
be absent if the state were free to appropriate property as it wished
without compensating the owner. The prohibition against uncompensated takings for public use enables the polity to maximize its
welfare over the long run by making it difficult to take steps that are
expedient in the short-term.
Preventing majorities from ill-considered actions against property owners does not require immunity from governmental actions.
The takings clause implicitly acknowledges that private ownership
of property is not absolute vis-a-vis the government; the public use
and compensation requirements protect individual owners against
government actions more weakly. In the terminology that Calabresi and Melamed coined,39 the Constitution protects private property against government actions through a liability rather than a
property rule, that is, through a rule that permits a forced sale to
the government. By making legislators put their money where their
mouths are, the public use and compensation requirements force
legislators to act responsibly in appropriating private property, but
37. This attribute holds for the classical liberal form of ownership but not for all forms
of private ownership. The rise of the corporate form of ownership, with its characteristic
separation of ownership and control, in this sense represents a regressive form of privatization. See Gregory S. Alexander, Pension and Passivity: Fiduciary Law and the Limitations of
Pension-Fund Socialism,- L. & Contemp. Prob.- (forthcoming 1992).
38. Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Studies in the Limitations of Rationality 196
(Cambridge U. Press, 1989).
39. Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
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do not entirely prevent government from appropriating private
property. Of course, none of this indicates just exactly which government actions that detrimentally affect private property trigger
the compensation requirement. The line between government regulations that are legitimate because they fall within an owner's responsibility to the communities to which he belongs and those that
fall outside that realm and thereby interfere with his sense of dignity
is contestable and controversial. The important point is to emphasize that some measure of restriction on individual use and enjoyment exists as a consequence of civic responsibility.
I suggested earlier that the civic understanding is partly expressed in the traditional noxious-use test for distinguishing permissible regulations from impermissible takings. The idea of
responsibility to the polity goes beyond that relatively narrow idea,
however. The broader idea is that the polity cedes a measure of
authority to individuals as property owners not only for them to
satisfy their own wants but also to promote the community's welfare, and in ceding that authority to the individual, it expects that
the individual will at times subordinate the pursuit of his wants for
a community welfare interest that is particularly acute or compelling, that is, more than the sort of interest required to satisfy the
minimal rationality requirement for exercises of the police power.40
In light of this expectation-a condition on all ownership interests-it is not unjust or unfair for the polity to impose some limits
on an individual's freedom to use or enjoy his property in some way
in the interest of an important collective interest that the polity has
identified after deliberate public discussion. The civic responsibility
theory explains, for example, why welfare programs, which are obviously redistributive, are not usually considered to constitute unconstitutional takings. The wealthier members of the community
owe a responsibility to alleviate the abject poverty that other mem40. This distinction is necessary to avoid the problem that confronts the rationale that
Justice Brennan introduced in footnote 43 of his majority opinion in the Penn Central case.
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978). Referring to noxious-use cases (Hadacheck, Miller v. Shoene, and Goldblatt v. Hempstead), Justice Brennan
stated that these cases "are better understood as resting not on any supposed 'noxious' quality
of the prohibited uses but rather on the ground that the restrictions were reasonably related
to the implementation of a policy ... expected to produce a widespread public benefit and
applicable to all similarly situated property." 438 U.S. at 134 n.30. As stated, Justice Brennan's test hardly serves itself as an adequate justification for why certain land-use regulations
enacted through the exercise of the police power do not trigger the takings clause's compensation requirement. To be a valid exercise of the police power, the regulation must be reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective such as health or safety. As James Krier
points out, only by resorting to some concept like noxiousness can non-compensatory public
land-use restrictions be distinguished from restrictions that are compensatory. See James E.
Krier, The Regulation Machine, I Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. I, 7 (1982).
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bers of the community experience because the community has enabled them to own their wealth.4I
The civic vision can be seen as related to another traditional
takings test as well. The "reciprocity" test provides that a regulation restricting a property owner's advantage is not an unconstitutional taking if it simultaneously confers roughly reciprocal benefits
on the affected owner.42 Similarly, the civic vision holds that an
owner who apparently loses as a result of a governmental program
may in fact be a winner, sufficiently so that additional compensation
is not required. This will be the case, for example, when a government regulation prevents an owner from using his property in a way
that benefits him in the short run but actually makes him worse off
in the long run.
There is no a priori basis for determining the precise scope of
an owner's responsibilities to his communities under the civic vision. The problem is not simply that so many factors are involved
but that the scope of the responsibility concept itself is politically
and morally contestable. The practical judgment required to resolve these political and moral conflicts is intensely contextdependent. To prejudge the extent to which the community responsibilities of private ownership relieve the state from compensating
owners for actions taken with respect to their property would cut
off deliberative discussion, both within the political process and in
takings adjudication. Takings law is now largely characterized by
such context-specific adjudication, although critics continue to decry its detrimental effects on process values such as predictability.43
It matters a great deal how these two visions are mediated.
The objective ought to be mediating the conflicts in a way that ac41. In a very illuminating essay Carol Rose has recently described a similar understanding, which she calls "property-as-propriety." This understanding is closely linked with the
idea that individuals own property in trust for the larger community. See Carol M. Rose,
Property as Wealth, Property as Propriety, in John W. Chapman, ed., Nomos XXXIII.· Com·
pensatory Justice 223, 237-40 (N.Y.U. Press, 1991).
This idea also resembles the theory that Judge Breitel developed in his opinion for the
New York Court of Appeals in the Penn Central case, the "social increment" theory. See
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 42 N.Y.2d 324, 366 N.E.2d 1271, 397
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1977). According to this theory, which derives from Henry George's "single
tax" thesis (see Henry George, Progress and Poverty (1878)), Grand Central Terminal's rate
of return should be discounted by the increment of the building's value attributable to public
contributions, by way of subsidies, franchises, tax exemption, and other governmental benefits, and related community growth. The insight is, as Judge Breitel expressed it, that "society is [entitled] to receive its due for its share in the making of a once great railroad." 42
N.Y.2d at 333, 366 N.E.2d at 1276, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 919. The civic vision extends that
insight on the ground that the polity effectively enables the private ownership of all property.
42. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
43. See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against Ad-Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88
Colum. L. Rev. 1697 (1988).
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knowledges that neither vision is privileged. Such a method must,
in other words, be as open and democratic as possible. A formal
takings methodology of the kind urged by several commentators recently« is ill-suited to the open kind of process that I have in mind.
As a judicial technique, ad hoc balancing is the only way to assure
that the dialectic is not closed by one vision preempting the other
through some formal rule that effectively codifies it. Formality is
not neutral between these two substantive visions.4s A formal takings approach is very apt to enshrine the self-regarding vision rather
than the civic vision.
Although recent Supreme Court decisions hint at a growing
sense of restiveness toward balancing,46 we should not expect any
wholesale shift toward greater formality in takings adjudication.
While the Court's ideology is probably more favorably tilted toward
property rights and the self-regarding vision today than it has been
since the beginning of this century, the Court has also recently reaffirmed its conviction that the constitutional validity of regulations
under the takings clause is context-dependent.47 Moreover, some
members of the Court have reaffirmed the continued presence of the
civic vision despite the recrudescence of the self-regarding vision,
acknowledging, for example, that alleviating the hardship of tenants
through price regulation of rent is a legitimate legislative policy and
does not generally trigger the compensation requirement.4s It
seems highly unlikely, then, that the post-modern dialectic will disappear from the Court's takings rhetoric.

44. See Douglas W. Kmiec, The Original Understanding of the Taking Clause Is
Neither Weak nor Obtuse, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1630 (1988); Rose-Ackerman, 88 Colum. L.
Rev. at 1697 (cited in note 43).
45. For a similar argument, see Frank I. Michelman, Possession vs. Distribution in the
Constitutional Idea of Propeny, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 1319, 1321, 1321 n.10 (1987).
46. See Frank I. Michelman, Takings. 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600 (1988).
47. Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. I (1988).
48. ld.

